Being asked to recount a visual memory is common in educational settings, spatial navigation, and crime investigation. Previous studies show that recounting one's memory can benefit subsequent memory, but most of this work either used verbal materials or conflated category memory with memory for visual details. To test whether recounting may introduce visually-specific interference effects, we tested people's memory for photographs of objects, but introduced an intervening phase in which people described their memory. We separated memory for the specific exemplar from memory for the basic-level category. Contrary to recent findings on maps and colours, the intervening retrieval practice did not consistently strengthen exemplar memory of objects. Instead, recounting one's visual memory appeared to introduce interference that sometimes cancelled the benefit of increased retrieval effort. Delaying the final memory test by 24 hours increased the benefit of retrieval practice. These findings suggest that intervening retrieval has multiple effects on visual memory. Instead of being a snapshot, this memory constantly changes with retrieval practice and with time.
Introduction
Memory is traditionally assessed in two stages. First, people encode pertinent information to memory. Next, their memory is tested following a delay. This two-stage procedure overlooks the fact that people frequently recount their memory between encoding and the final test, a process that may alter memory. The past decade has seen a surge of research on effects of such intervening recall. Entitled "the testing effect," this new line of work demonstrates dramatic enhancement of memory by intervening retrieval practice (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) . The benefit stems largely from increased effort people exert during retrieval practice, allowing more cues to be associated with the encoded material and enhancing its accessibility during final testing (Bjork, 1975; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006) . The positive testing effect is sometimes accompanied by retrieval-induced forgetting, in which intervening retrieval practice impairs memory for related but not practiced stimuli (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 2000) . Because much of this work is conducted in the context of education, it relies heavily on verbal materials such as word lists or passages. Few studies have directly examined effects of intervening recall on visual memory, the focus of the current study.
Two reasons suggest that the testing effect may be similar between verbal and visual memory. First, the leading theory of the testing effect -the retrieval effort account -makes no reference to the type of material. Effects of retrieval effort are to increase the accessibility of the encoded material, as such, they should apply to both verbal and visual stimuli. Second, visual memory typically contains both visual details of the image and its basic-level category. The latter is not strictly visual as people tend to name visual objects at their basic-level category (Rosch, 1975) . This basic-level category, thus, may share a representational format with verbal memory, raising the likelihood that information about object category is coded both visually and verbally. As long as basic-level category is a part of the memory tested, similar effects are expected for visual and verbal materials.
Consistent with the material-independent account just mentioned, recent studies on visual memory have revealed positive effects of intervening retrieval. Carpenter and Pashler (2007) asked participants to study two maps. Subsequently, one map was studied once again (restudy). For the other map, participants viewed an altered version and recalled missing features. Immediately afterwards participants drew the maps from memory. Reproduction was better for the map that received retrieval practice than for the one restudied. Extending these findings to colours, Sutterer and Awh (2016) presented participants with coloured shapes such as a blue dinosaur or an orange bird. Participants saw some of the coloured shapes for a second time, and viewed a white version of the other shapes and recalled their colour. In a final test administered either immediately or more than a day later, participants recalled the colour of more shapes from the retrieval practice condition than from the restudy condition. Finally, Maxcey and Woodman (2014) examined retrieval-induced-forgetting using photographs of common objects. They presented two exemplars per category (e.g., two sports cars, two muffins) during the initial encoding phase, then introduced retrieval of one exemplar (e.g., sports car A), and immediately afterwards tested old-new memory for both exemplars as well as objects not included in retrieval (e.g., the muffins). Results showed two effects of intervening retrieval: it enhanced memory for the exemplar included in retrieval (e.g., sports car A), but impaired memory for the encoded but not practiced exemplar (e.g., sports car B), relative to items from categories not included in retrieval. These findings suggest that recounting one's visual memory strengthens that memory, though it may induce forgetting of related but not-practiced stimuli.
An important difference between visual and verbal stimuli, however, suggests that intervening retrieval may have unique effects on visual memory. The visual component of the memory does not easily lend itself to a verbal code. Neuroimaging studies show that visual cortical regions are recruited to retain visual memory. For example, remembering faces preferentially activates the fusiform face area whereas remembering scenes preferentially activates the parahippocampal place area (Ranganath, DeGutis, & D'Esposito, 2004) . If the intervening retrieval involves verbalizing a visual memory, such as when one recounts a complex graph learned in class or a recent hiking trip, the introduction of a verbal code may distort the original visual memory.
Supporting this interference account is the classic demonstration of verbal overshadowing. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) showed participants a videotape of a crime scene and asked some participants to describe the perpetrator's face. Five minutes later, all participants performed a final recognition test of the perpetrator's face. Those who previously described the perpetrator performed worse than those who did not verbalize the description in selecting the perpetrator from a lineup. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler suggest that having verbally described the faces, participants may have re-coded their memory in verbal codes, interfering with visual memory. Verbal overshadowing suggests that retrieval practice can interfere with the original visual memory. However, the replicability of this effect is controversial (Lovett, Small, & Engstrom, 1992; Yu & Geiselman, 1993) , raising questions about its generality.
Interference effects may extend beyond verbal overshadowing. Even when the intervening retrieval does not involve verbal re-coding, this act may interfere with visual memory if inaccurate or misleading visual details are retrieved. When an experimenter introduces misleading information during a retrieval attempt, this information is incorporated and re-consolidated to form new, and incorrect memory (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009) . Misinformation effects are widespread in eyewitness memory (Loftus, 2005) . They may also happen when participants themselves, rather than the experimenters, introduce misinformation during a retrieval attempt (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998a; Reyna, 1995) . The potential presence of interference may explain why, in Sutterer and Awh (2016) , retrieval practice increased the number of objects recalled, but not the precision of the recalled memory. It may have also contributed to the retrieval-induced-forgetting observed in Maxcey and Woodman (2014) .
The above review suggests that intervening recall may have multiple effects on visual memory, particularly memory for visual details. However, several factors obscure an understanding of these effects. First, although previous studies tested visual memory, they did not adequately separate memory for visual details from memory for basic categories. Map memory in Carpenter and Pashler (2007) was evaluated at a coarse level, in terms of whether certain features were drawn in the correct relative spatial locations. Colours used in Sutterer and Awh (2016) could be named, and given the lack of an enhancement in memory precision, the enhanced memory accessibility may be attributed to the categorical rather than visual component. Maxcey and Woodman (2014) used an old-new task, where performance may be supported by both category and detailed memory. The lineup task used in Schooler and EngstlerSchooler (1990) is the only one that presents exemplar-level foils at testing. As reviewed above, this line of work shows interference. However, memory for unfamiliar faces is notoriously poor (Bruce, Henderson, Newman, & Burton, 2001; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000) , limiting the generality of the latter finding. One important goal of the current study is to isolate memory for visual details by using a forced-choice recognition task that includes exemplar-level foils.
A second limitation of the previous studies is the variety of temporal delay between intervening retrieval and the final memory test. Most common is an immediate test (Carpenter & Pashler, 2007; Maxcey & Woodman, 2014; Sutterer & Awh, 2016) . Some administered the test more than one-day later (Sutterer & Awh, 2016's Experiment 3) . This factor makes it difficult to compare across studies. In the larger literature on the testing effect, an increase in the delay interval is known to strengthen the testing effect. In fact, Roediger and Karpicke (2006) 's classic study found a testing effect using passages only after a delay (2 days or 1 week later). Whether analogous effects are seen with visual stimuli are unclear. An examination of delay interval is theoretically and practically important. Theoretically, it allows us to uncover effects that may be apparent only after a delay. Practically, this research has implications for memory tasks in applied situations (e.g., classroom learning; eyewitness testimony), which often extend over long delay intervals. The second goal of the present study is to investigate effects of delay interval by administering both immediate and 24hr-delayed tests.
Experiment 1
This experiment establishes the basic experimental procedure. Stimuli were photographs of real objects (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008; Maxcey & Woodman, 2014) . These stimuli not only yield rich visual memory, but also permit a straightforward separation of category and exemplar memory. The procedure consists of three phases: encoding, intervening cued recall, and recognition. In Phase 1 (encoding), photographs of objects were shown one at a time for encoding. All objects were semantically distinct. For example, the encoding phase could not contain two different apples; this differs from Maxcey and Woodman (2014) who presented two exemplars per category for encoding. Next, in Phase 2 (intervening recall), participants typed out a description for a subset of the objects. Finally, in Phase 3 (final test), we assessed recognition memory for all objects. To isolate exemplar memory from memory for basic category, each trial of the final test contained four images: the old object, a different exemplar from the same basic-level category as the old object, and two exemplars from a new basic-level category. All phases were administered on the same day in Experiment 1; a later experiment examined longer delays between Phases 2 and 3.
With the design above, we computed two types of visual memory. Category memory was indexed by the proportion of times that participants chose the correct category -either the old object or the exemplar foil, rather than the new category. Exemplar (detailed) memory was indexed by the proportion of times that participants chose the old object rather than the exemplar foil. In probability terms, exemplar memory was computed as P(old object | correct category). Our research focus is primarily on exemplar memory, a type of memory likely distinct from verbal memory. We examined whether intervening cued recall enhanced this memory, as expected from recent studies on the testing effect, or whether it interfered with exemplar memory, as expected from verbal re-coding or misinformation effects.
Method
Participants. Participants in this study were students from the University of Minnesota, all Native English speakers, naïve to the purpose of the study, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, normal colour vision, and no history of neurological or psychiatric conditions. No participant was tested in more than one experiment. Study protocol was approved by the University of Minnesota IRB.
Sample size. A power analysis was conducted, using the power.t.test function in R, based on Experiment 1 of Sutterer and Awh (2016) , with a reported Cohen's d of 3.64 (p. 835, t(11) = -6.03). A sample size of 6 achieves a power greater than 0.80. In addition, to counterbalance experimental materials across conditions in this study, sample size needs to be in multiples of 12. Based on these considerations, each of Experiments 1A-C tested 12 participants, and subsequent experiments that examined additional factors tested 24 participants. The final sample size fluctuated slightly due to participant signups.
Thirty-seven participants completed Experiment 1. There were 13 in Experiment 1A (10 females and 3 males, M = 19 years old, SD = 1.1), 12 in Experiment 1B (8 females and 4 males, M = 19.5 years old, SD = 1.3), and 12 in Experiment 1C (10 females and 2 males, M = 19.5 years old, SD = 2.0).
Equipment. Participants were tested individually in a room with normal interior lighting. They sat approximately 40cm away from a 19" CRT monitor (resolution 1024x768 pixels; refresh rate 75Hz). The experiment was programmed using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) implemented in MATLAB (www.mathworks.com).
Materials. Photographs of objects were sampled from Brady and Oliva's object database (http://cvcl.mit.edu/MM/stimuli.html). There were 2 exemplars from 310 distinct object categories.
Procedure and Design. Participants were tested in three phases, separated by 2 minutes between phases (Figure 1 ).
Figure 1. A schematic illustration of the encoding, cued recall, and recognition phases. A. The encoding phase presented each object at a pace of 1s/image. All images came from different basic-level categories. B. An example of the intervening cued recall phase. Participants were asked to type out a description of the named object that they saw in the preceding phase. C. The recognition phase with the old object, an exemplar foil, and two between-category foils not seen previously. Information about the dimension of stimuli was not actually shown on the display.
(1) Phase 1: encoding. In the first phase, participants viewed a series of photographs presented at the center of the screen (24.6ºx24.6º), at a pace of 1s/image. They were asked to remember the objects. To ensure that they engaged in the task, we asked them to monitor occasional image repetitions. The sequence contained 170 images, including 150 objects that appeared once, and 10 fillers that appeared twice. The 170 images were presented in a random order. The fillers were included for the repetition detection task and were not used in subsequent phases. The same 10 categories served as fillers for all participants, leaving us with 300 categories from the image set. A random half of the 300 categories was assigned for encoding and the other half as foils in the testing phase (phase 3). This assignment was reversed for half of the participants. The 150 target objects were categorically distinct at the basic level. Half of the participants encoded one of the exemplars of a given category, while the other exemplar served as an exemplar foil in the testing phase. This was reversed for the other half of the participants. Object categories and exemplars used for targets and foils were fully counterbalanced across participants.
The three versions of the experiment differed in minor ways. In Experiments 1A and 1B, photographs were presented visually only. Participants pressed a button whenever they detected a repetition. In Experiment 1C, a voice naming the object accompanied the photograph. The voice was added to ensure a clear correspondence between the verbal cues used in Phase 2 and the objects. The audio files were edited to last no longer than 1s. The audio tied up the computer processor, preventing online keyboard responses. Participants therefore kept a count of the number of repetitions and reported that number at the end of Phase 1.
(2) Phase 2: intervening cued recall. A random third of the encoded objects (N=50) were used in the second phase. The assignment of stimuli for inclusion in Phase 2 was counterbalanced across participants. In this phase, participants were shown the written name of an object on the screen. A voice announcing the object's name was played alongside in Experiment 1C. Participants were asked to type out a detailed description of the named object they saw in Phase 1. After they finished typing they clicked "OK" to proceed to the next one. No feedback was given. To further increase recall effort, Experiments 1B and 1C included an additional instruction for participants to describe the objects in such a way that someone else could pick out the objects based on their description.
(3) Phase 3: final memory test. The final memory test included 150 trials. On each trial, four objects were presented, one in each quadrant (image size: 14.7ºx14.7º; the center of each image was 11.7º from fixation, horizontally displaced by 7.9° and vertically displaced by 8.6° from fixation). One object, the old object, was previously presented in the encoding phase. Another object was from the same basic-level category as the old object, but was a new exemplar (the "exemplar foil"). The other two objects were two exemplars from a basic-level category not presented previously (the "between-category foils"). The position of the four objects were random. Participants were asked to click on the object they saw before. A tone provided feedback.
Results

Encoding phase
Participants conducted a repetition detection task in Phase 1. For Experiments 1A and 1B where participants pressed a button whenever a repetition was detected, mean hit rate was 77% (S.E. = 3%) and mean false alarm rate was 2% (S.E. = 0.5%). For Experiment 1C where participants tallied the total number of repetitions, mean repetitions detected was 7.3 (S.E. = 2) out of 10. Repetition detection rates were also high in subsequent experiments. Participants reported 8.5 repetitions in Experiment 2, 10 in Experiment 3, 10 in Experiment 4A, and 9.4 in Experiment 4B. These results verified that participants were engaged in the encoding task.
Intervening recall
The verbal descriptions participants provided frequently contained a mixture of accurate and incorrect descriptions. To assess the accuracy of the description, we asked three coders to identify the object participants described. The coders were shown participants' descriptions along with the old object and the exemplar foil. Coders accurately identified just 57% of the old object (S.E. = 1%), a level close to but significantly higher than chance, t(36) = 47.75, p < .001. Similar low levels of coder accuracy were seen in Experiment 2 (59%), Experiment 3 (57%), Experiment 4A (61%), and Experiment 4B (59%). Thus, verbal descriptions participants gave were not useful in guiding a third person. However, the results do not mean that participants' own memory was poor -the description was given without knowing the nature of the exemplar foils, so participants could not have anticipated key features necessary for the coders' task. In fact, coder accuracy was considerably lower than participants own recognition rates (see Final memory test section).
When analyzing coders' performance based on participants' recognition results in the third phase, coders were significantly above chance (63%) for images that participants themselves successfully identified later on, t(36) = 9.05, p < .001. The coders' accuracy, however, declined to a level significantly below chance (39%) for objects to which participants later chose the exemplar foil instead of the target, t(36) = 6.44, p < .001. This suggests that when participants had poorer exemplar recognition memory, their earlier verbal description of the objects contained misinformation, misguiding coders to choose the exemplar foil more often than the target. Similar results were obtained in subsequent experiments and will not be further reported.
Final memory test
On each trial of the final memory test, participants were shown an old object, a new exemplar from the same category as the old object ("exemplar foil"), or two objects from a new category ("category foils"). Responses could fall into any of these three types (Table 1) . Two of the responses reflected correct category memory. Hence category memory was computed as the proportion of trials that participants chose the correct category (the old object or the exemplar foil) out of all choices. Exemplar memory was computed among trials that participants chose the correct category. It was the proportion of trials that participants chose the old object out of trials where a correct category was chosen. As shown in Figure 2 , intervening cued recall had opposite effects on category memory and exemplar memory. An ANOVA on type of memory (category or exemplar), intervening recall (included or not included), and experimental version (1A, 1B, or 1C) revealed a significant interaction between type of memory and intervening recall, F(1, 34) = 57.37, p < .001, η p 2 = .63; there was no three-way interaction, F(2, 34) = .77, p > .40.
We next separately analyzed category and exemplar memories. For category memory, an ANOVA on intervening recall and experimental version revealed a significant main effect of recall status, F(1, 34) = 107.77, p < .001, η p 2 = .76, an effect that did not interact with experimental version, F(2, 34) = 1.86, p > .15. Performance was 12% higher for objects included in Phase 2 than for those not included. In contrast, exemplar memory showed the opposite. The main effect of intervening recall, F(1, 34) = 5.17, p < .02, η p 2 = .13, which did not interact with experimental version, F < 1, was driven by a 3% reduction in performance for objects included in the intervening recall. 
of the category foils during the recognition phase (phase 3), for objects included and not included in the preceding intervening cued recall phase (phase 2). Standard error of the mean is shown in parenthesis.
Discussion
The cued recall procedure revealed different effects on category and exemplar memory of visual objects. Objects included in the cued recall phase were associated with better category memory than those not included in the cued recall. The enhanced category memory is consistent with previous studies that used maps (Carpenter & Pashler, 2007) , colours (Sutterer & Awh, 2016) , and objects (Maxcey & Woodman, 2014) . The finding falls in line with the testing effect. This enhancement may also be attributed to the nature of the intervening recall. The cue used in that phase was categorical, which re-exposed participants to the category information of the objects. Thus, it is ambiguous whether the enhanced category memory is due exclusively to the testing effect or additionally to a re-exposure of the category label. This ambiguity does not affect the interpretation of exemplar memory because the cue provided no information about which exemplar was old. The reduction in exemplar memory suggests that recounting one's memory can be detrimental, which outweighs the benefit of increased retrieval effort. The source of the detrimental effects may lie in verbal re-coding or the introduction of misinformation from inaccurate recall. The next experiment presents a replication of these findings along with an initial test on the role of verbal re-coding due to verbalization.
Experiment 2
Perhaps the most surprising finding of Experiment 1 was the lack of a positive exemplar memory benefit for objects recounted in the intervening phase. If anything, exemplar memory was impaired for the recounted objects. This impairment may have been due to verbal re-coding from verbally recounting the objects during the intervening recall phase. Experiment 2 aims to replicate this finding and examine the role that verbalization plays in producing this effect on exemplar memory. In Experiment 2, we investigate whether the lack of a positive effect, from recounting, on exemplar memory extends to objects that are recalled but not verbally described as well. To this end, we included two types of trials in the intervening phase. In one type, participants were asked to visualize the cued object and type out a verbal description, as before. In the second type, participants were only asked to visualize the cued object, minimizing verbal re-coding. As in Experiment 1, the final test was administered on the same day, and it involved a 4-alternative-forced-choice (4AFC) recognition task.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four participants, 16 females and 6 males, completed Experiment 2 (M = 19.1 years old, SD = 1.0).
Design and procedure. This experiment was the same as Experiment 1C, except for Phase 2. Specifically, of the 150 encoded objects, a random subset of 100 was included in Phase 2. On each trial of the cued recall task, participants were cued with the object name and asked to visualize the object they saw from the encoding phase. To increase the accountability of visualization, participants were asked to indicate whether they were highly confident, somewhat confident, or not confident that they had visualized the exact picture shown to them earlier. For a random half of these 100 objects, a window with the name of the object appeared after the confidence rating, and participants typed out a description of the object to enable someone else to identify it. For the other half of the objects, a verbal description was not requested. Instead, the next cue was presented immediately after the confidence rating. Thus, all 100 objects were visualized, and a random half of these were also described verbally. The other 50 objects were not included in Phase 2. Assignment of stimuli to conditions was randomized and counterbalanced across participants.
Results
Figure 3. Recognition memory results from Experiment 2. Objects were separated based on whether they were visualized, visualized and described, or not included in Phase 2. Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean.
Replicating Experiment 1, an ANOVA on recall condition (not included, visualized, or visualized+described) and memory type (category or exemplar) revealed a significant interaction, F(2, 46) = 15.87, p < .001, η p 2 = .41. As shown in Figure 3 , category memory was enhanced by intervening recall, F(2, 46) = 30.60, p < .001, η p 2 = .57. It was about 12% better for both objects visualized and described, and those visualized only, than objects not in recall, t (23) In contrast, exemplar memory was slightly reduced by intervening recall, though this difference did not reach significance, F(2, 46) = 1.59, p > .20. Objects visualized and described had a 3.7% decline in exemplar memory than those not in recall, a marginally significant effect, t(23) = 1.87, p < .08. The deficit was 1.7% for those visualized only; this was not significant, t(23) = 0.76, p > .45.
Discussion
Intervening cued recall once again facilitated category memory but not exemplar memory. This pattern held both for objects visualized and described, and those visualized only. The similarity between these two conditions suggests that the act of intervening retrieval, rather than verbalization, is the primary driver behind the findings. The robust facilitation of category memory is consistent with previously observed testing effect, or with the possibility that memory is enhanced because participants were re-exposed to the category information. Unlike several recent studies on this topic, however, the enhancement did not extend to exemplar memory. If anything, exemplar memory showed a small decline of about 3%, an effect that reached significance in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. This finding provides initial evidence that intervening cued recall may introduce multiple effects: an increase in retrieval effort may be overridden by interference effects from the act of intervening retrieval. Due to the uniqueness of this finding in the recent literature on visual memory, we attempted a third replication in Experiment 3 using a simpler recognition task.
Experiment 3
The first two experiments used a 4AFC procedure to probe recognition memory. Exemplar memory was computed by restricting the analysis to trials in which participants chose the correct category. Although this design allowed us to simultaneously gauge category memory and exemplar memory, the presence of new categories during testing may have introduced extraneous effects. Experiment 3 aims to replicate the key findings of the first two experiments regarding exemplar memory. To this end, we simplified the final testing into a 2AFC procedure, in which only the old object and an exemplar foil were included.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four new participants completed Experiment 3. There were 13 females and 11 males (M = 19.8 years old, SD = 1.7).
Design and procedure. This experiment was the same as Experiment 1C except for a change in the final testing phase. Instead of being presented with four options, on each trial participants saw two options presented side by side on the horizontal meridian (the center of each image was 7.9º away from fixation). One option was an old object they saw earlier, the other was an object from the same category (i.e. exemplar foil). The participants' task was to click on the object they saw before.
Results and Discussion
Similar to the first two experiments, we did not observe a positive testing effect ( Figure  4) . Exemplar memory for objects recounted was 2.8% lower than those not recounted, a difference that was not significant, t(23) = 1.33, p > .19.
Figure 4. Recognition exemplar memory results from Experiment 3 for objects included and not included in the intervening recall phase. The final test included two choices: the old object and an exemplar foil. Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean.
Together, the first three experiments showed an absence of the typical testing effect for exemplar memory. This was not simply a null result. The sample size was large -85 combined across all experiments, a sample size adequate to detect a testing effect comparable in size to Sutterer and Awh (2016; 73 participants across three experiments). Exemplar memory was numerically lower for objects included in the intervening recall than for those not included. This reached significance in one experiment. This finding contrasts with the memory enhancement observed recently for maps (Carpenter & Pashler, 2007) , colours (Sutterer & Awh, 2016) , and objects (Maxcey & Woodman, 2014) .
Experiment 4
The lack of a testing effect from the first three experiments may suggest that the retrieval effort account does not apply to exemplar memory. However, the finding is also compatible with the possibility that a testing effect was offset by interference from verbal re-coding or misinformation. One way to test this possibility is to increase the memory delay between Phases 2 and 3. The bifurcation model (Kornell, Bjork, & Garcia, 2011) suggests that when the final test is delayed, the testing benefit is larger because retrieval practice strengthens memory of the practiced items, protecting them from delay-induced forgetting. This is exactly the pattern seen in previous studies using verbal materials (Liu & Reder, 2016; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006; Wheeler, Ewers, & Buonanno, 2003) . Here we investigated whether the same is true with exemplar memory.
Two experiments were administered. In both experiments the delay between Phases 2 and 3 was increased to 24 hours. Experiment 4A was identical to Experiment 1C in its use of a 4AFC final test; Experiment 4B was identical to Experiment 3 in its use of a 2AFC final test. These experiments were conceptual replications of each other. If a testing effect on exemplar memory is observed with the delay, it would suggest that intervening recall could have long-term facilitatory effects on memory. Design and procedure. Other than a change of the delay interval between Phases 2 and 3 to 24 hours, Experiment 4A was identical to Experiment 1C, whereas Experiment 4B was identical to Experiment 3. The final memory test was a 4AFC in Experiment 4A, permitting separate assessment of category and exemplar memory. The final memory test was a 2AFC in Experiment 4B, a simpler procedure focusing exclusively on exemplar memory.
Results
Figure 5. Recognition category and exemplar memory results from Experiment 4A (left-4AFC task) and recognition exemplar memory results from 4B (right-2AFC task) for objects included and not included in the intervening recall phase. The memory delay between Phases 2 and 3 was 24 hours. Error bars showed ±1S.E. of the mean.
Following a 24-hour delay between the intervening cued recall and the final test, we observed a strengthening of the testing effect in both Experiments 4A and 4B ( Figure 5 ). To enable a direct assessment of the modulating effect of delay, the following analysis included delay interval as a between-subject factor.
1. 4AFC: immediate (Experiment 1) vs. 24-hr delay (Experiment 4A) Category memory was better for objects included in the intervening recall than for objects not included. This was true both when the final test was immediate and when it was delayed by 24 hours, though the effect was stronger in the latter case. An ANOVA with intervening recall as a within-subject factor and memory delay as a between-subject factor showed a significant main effect of intervening recall, F(1, 59) = 251.18, p < .001, η p 2 = .81, as well as a significant interaction, F(1, 59) = 5.66, p < .05, η p 2 = .09. Intervening recall enhanced category memory by about 16.8% with a 24-hour delay (t(23) = 12.89, p < .001), compared to 12% without a delay.
Adding a 24-hr delay flipped effects of intervening recall on exemplar memory. Whereas objects included in the intervening recall yielded 3% worse exemplar memory than objects not included (Experiment 1), this difference switched signs to a 6% gain following a 24-hour delay (Experiment 4A; t(23) = 3.87, p < .01 ). An ANOVA on intervening recall and memory delay revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 59) = 18.58, p < .001, η p 2 = .24. Replicating the findings from the 4AFC, in the 2AFC task we again found opposite effects of intervening recall for immediate and delayed memory tests. The 2.8% numerical cost of exemplar memory for objects included in the intervening recall (Experiment 3) reversed to a 6.2% facilitation after a 24-hour delay (Experiment 4B, t(23) = 3.80, p < .01 ). An ANOVA on intervening recall and memory delay yielded a significant interaction, F(1, 46) = 11.38, p < .01, η p 2 = .20.
Discussion
Inserting a 24-hour delay between intervening recall (Phase 2) and final recognition (Phase 3) produced a more positive effect of intervening recall. The already positive effect on category memory increased in strength following a 24-hour memory delay. The small negative effect of intervening recall on exemplar memory reversed to a positive testing effect. These findings are consistent with previous research that used verbal stimuli. Time delay appears to enhance the benefit of intervening memory retrieval (e.g., Liu & Reder, 2016) . Importantly, adding a time delay uncovers the positive testing effect that was otherwise not detectable in Experiments 1-3. These findings suggest that intervening recall likely slows forgetting of recalled items such that a clear testing benefit on exemplar memory emerges only when a delay follows intervening recall test.
General Discussion
Four experiments examined effects of intervening retrieval on visual memory. Using a recognition test that isolates exemplar memory from category memory, we showed that intervening retrieval facilitates exemplar memory when tested 24-hours later. The enhancement is reminiscent of the testing effect typically seen with verbal materials. However, when testing is administered immediately, no facilitation is seen. If anything, exemplar memory for recounted objects is slightly reduced. This latter finding suggests that intervening retrieval may introduce detrimental effects on memory. The detrimental effects are anticipated from prior work on the verbal overshadowing effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990 ) and misinformation effect (Loftus, 2005) . Thus, exactly how intervening retrieval affects exemplar memory depends on the relative strength of opposing effects. Temporal delay modulates the competition between different effects. At longer delays, the benefit of increased retrieval effort increases (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) , producing a net gain. At shorter delays, the detrimental effects of verbal re-coding and misinformation may sometimes outweigh the positive testing effect.
The temporal dynamics revealed in this study are consistent with previous findings using word lists (Liu & Reder, 2016) or passages (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) . It supports the bifurcation model, according to which an increase in retrieval effort slows down forgetting (Kornell et al., 2011) . The lack of a testing effect when tested immediately, however, contradicts recent studies on visual memory, most of which tested memory immediately after retrieval practice (e.g., Carpenter & Pashler, 2007) . Several factors may contribute to this contradiction. First, previous studies did not fully distinguish category memory from exemplar memory. The old-new memory test, for example, can be supported by both. Our study suggests that category memory may be less vulnerable to detrimental effects of verbal re-coding and misinformation. Second, the studies differ in the nature of the intervening retrieval task, which may have influenced both the benefit from retrieval effort and the cost from verbal re-coding and misinformation. Intervening tasks that yield highly accurate retrieval, and minimize verbal recoding and the introduction of misinformation, are likely to produce just a positive testing effect. Carpenter and Pashler (2007) used an altered map to probe memory for missing features. The similarity of the cue to the actual map is likely to minimize inaccurate retrieval. Maxcey and Woodman (2014) used a 2AFC recognition task as the retrieval practice, which was also unlikely to introduce false information. In contrast, the open-ended visualization and description task used in the current study is likely to yield inaccurate retrieval. In fact, an examination of participants' verbal recall in Phase 2 suggests that their recall included misinformation. Coders, as a result, were more likely to choose the wrong exemplar when participants themselves chose the exemplar foil, suggesting the presence of false memory. This finding is consistent with previous work on false memory, which shows that exposure to items either verbally (Neushatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003) or visually (Sapkota, van der Linde, & Pardhan, 2015) can lead to the erroneous memory that a related, but not previously presented, item was also seen before during the experiment. In our study, details of a tent seen in the participant's past experiences (outside of the experiment) may have been included in their verbal recall of the tent shown during the first phase of the experiment. The inaccurate descriptions in the recall may, thus, have increased detrimental effects of the retrieval practice, overriding the positive testing effect. Having said this, the source of the false memory in this study is unclear -it could be that people had false memory to begin with, or that the intervening recall had introduced false memory. Future studies are needed to further examine the nature of object memory.
Similar to other studies on the testing effect, in our experiments participants could be multitasking during the intervening recall phase -recalling the cued objects as well as remembering all of the objects seen in phase 1. It is well known that concurrent tasks interfere with memory (Sapkota, Pardhan, & van der Linde, 2013) . It is therefore possible that the act of recalling the cued objects had interfered with memory. However, any such interference effect should apply to all objects held in memory, not just to those recalled in Phase 2. Thus, generic dual-task interference does not explain why in some cases (e.g., Experiment 1) exemplar memory was impaired for only those objects that were recalled and not for other objects that were not recalled in phase 2.
Our study reconciles apparent contradictions from previous studies on visual memory. We suggest that retrieval effort, verbal overshadowing, and misinformation jointly affect how intervening retrieval affects visual memory. Temporal delay and the nature of retrieval practice affect the relative strength of these factors. The dynamic view of intervening retrieval explains a wide range of empirical findings, from detrimental effects of verbal overshadowing to the standard testing effect. Because memory for visual details is particularly vulnerable to interference from verbal re-coding and misinformation, recounting one's visual memory may yield interference effects not typically seen for verbal stimuli.
Our study has implications for practical situations involving visual memory, such as eyewitness memory, classroom learning of graph or images, and remembering visual experience from the past. Recounting one's visual memory can be beneficial, especially if the memory needs to be retained for a long time. However, such recounting may also introduce interference, which at shorter intervals may override the benefit of the retrieval practice. An important future research question is to identify approaches that minimize interference from verbal re-coding and misinformation.
The current study used category names to cue object memory during the intervening recall phase. As noted earlier, this procedure re-exposed participants to the category label, a factor that may have contributed to enhanced category memory for objects included in the recall. Memory of the cue could then have faded over the 24-hour delay, and contributed to changes in category memory over time. The use of a category cue, therefore, made it more difficult to interpret how intervening recall influenced category memory. This was the reason we focused on exemplar memory in the present study. Because the categorical cue was uninformative of which exemplar participants saw earlier within a category, effects of intervening recall on exemplar memory cannot be explained by the nature of the cue. Nonetheless, future studies should use non-categorical cues to investigate effects of intervening recall on visual memory.
Conclusion
Four experiments suggest that intervening retrieval affects visual memory in several ways. One is through facilitation from increased retrieval effort, and the other is through interference effects from a likely combination of verbal re-coding and misinformation effects. A longer delay strengthens the positive effects from intervening retrieval. These findings support the view that visual memory is dynamic. Despite its high capacity and fidelity, visual memory is not a snapshot of one's previous experience. Rather, it is constantly in flux and modified as we think or talk about what we have seen.
